An iron prison gate standing open; a man walks out of the prison toward a green valley and an open horizon

No State Owns a Human Life

Introduction: Who Owns a Human Life?

Every execution, before it is a judicial sentence, rests on a silent premise: that some power — a state, a court, a law, or a majority — owns the right to end a human life. The rope is only the instrument; the real claim is a claim of ownership. This article puts that premise itself on trial.

Our central claim is this: the right to life is not a right the state grants to the human being; therefore the state cannot take it back. If human life were a "privilege" bestowed by power, then power would own that privilege, and revoking it would be its right. But if the right to life is inherent and prior — if a person holds it simply by virtue of being human — then no power, by any procedure and under any name, owns it.

In this discussion we draw on the thought of Karl Marx, but with a clear methodological discipline: throughout the article we distinguish between what Marx himself documented and wrote, and what we extend from the logic of his philosophy. Marx wrote no independent treatise on the abolition of the death penalty; but once, in 1853, he wrote directly about capital punishment and took a strikingly explicit position, and his philosophy of alienation, domination, and the turning of the human being into an instrument provides the theoretical materials for constructing a fundamental principle. We formulate that principle at the end of the article: the principle of the non-ownability of human life — a principle we propose as one of the foundations of the chapter "Freedom, Justice and the Right to Life" in the theory of A New Social Order in the Age of Consciousness.

1. The Right to Life: A Right the State Does Not Grant

Rights that are granted can be taken back. If the state were the source of the right to life, execution would merely be the repossession of its own property, and there would be nothing to argue about. The entire logic of modern human rights is built on the negation of exactly that proposition: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in its Article 3, proclaims the right to life as a universal and inherent right — that is, states "recognize" it; they do not create it. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in its Article 6, likewise speaks of the "inherent right to life" — inherent, meaning attached to the human being himself, not to the ruler's permission.

The first precise formulation of this argument was given by Cesare Beccaria, the Italian jurist, in On Crimes and Punishments (1764). His argument is simple and devastating: the sovereignty of a society is nothing but the sum of the smallest portions of liberty that each individual has ceded to the whole. But no human being ever held a right to kill himself or another, such that he could cede it to society. Therefore the sum of those cessions contains no right to kill, and the state cannot exercise what was never given to it. For this reason Beccaria regarded the death penalty not as a right of society, but as "a war of a whole nation against a citizen."

The conclusion is clear: the law may judge, may punish, may restrict liberty; but the law is not the source of the right to life. A parliament that passes an execution law does not inherit a right it never owned.

2. The Non-Ownability of Human Life: A Category Error

"Property," in its legal sense, has three components: the right to use, the right to exploit, and the right to destroy. A thing is property if it can be consumed, sold, given away, or eliminated. Human history knows an era in which the human being was defined by exactly these three components: slavery. The slave was a human being who was "property" — bought and sold, inherited, and whose killing, in many legal systems, counted as damage to the owner's property rather than the murder of a person.

The abolition of slavery established one principle — at least at the level of declaration: the human person cannot be an object of ownership. But that principle remains half-finished if we accept that although no individual may own another human being, the state may, through a court verdict, become the owner of his "life." The only difference is the intermediary: in slavery, ownership was direct; in execution, ownership passes through a case file, a court, and a verdict, and at the moment of execution it reaches its most complete form — the right to destroy.

The theoretical step of this article is precisely this: human life is not an object of ownership — neither private ownership nor state ownership. And this holds even for a person's relation to his own life: from the fact that my life is "mine," it does not follow that I can cede it wholesale and forever to another, or that another can acquire it. It is exactly here that Marx enters the discussion.

3. What Did Marx Say? Three Texts and One Article

a) Alienation: The Human Being Must Not Become an Instrument

In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx formulated the concept of alienation: under capitalism, the worker is estranged from the product of his labor, from the activity of labor itself, from his species-being, and from other human beings; his life-activity is reduced to a means of survival, and the human being, instead of being the conscious subject of his own life, becomes an instrument of the accumulation and power of others.

From this standpoint, the fundamental question in any social order is this: is the human being the subject of his own life, or an instrument? Every institution that turns the human being into an instrument — an instrument of production, an instrument of revenge, an instrument for intimidating others — stands on the very path Marx criticized.

b) Capital: Even the Market Does Not Buy the Human Person

In Chapter 6 of Volume I of Capital, Marx draws a distinction that is decisive for our discussion. The worker is the owner of his labour-power and can sell it — but only for a definite period. Marx writes:

The owner of labour-power must sell it only for a definite period, for if he were to sell it rump and stump, once for all, he would be selling himself, converting himself from a free man into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity. He must constantly look upon his labour-power as his own property, his own commodity, and this he can only do by placing it at the disposal of the buyer temporarily, for a definite period of time. By this means alone can he avoid renouncing his rights of ownership over it.

And before that, he states that the worker must be "the untrammelled owner of his capacity for labour, i.e., of his person." Note well: even within capitalist relations — which Marx regarded as a system of exploitation — buying labour-power does not mean buying the human being; between "selling labour-power" and "selling the person" there is a line whose crossing means a return to slavery.

The extension we draw from this logic is this: if even a private buyer cannot acquire the human person, by what logic can the state acquire his life? If selling oneself wholesale turns a free human being into a commodity, then the wholesale taking of a life by the state turns the citizen into an object of power's ownership.

c) The Critique of the Gotha Programme: Living by Others' Permission

In the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), Marx has a sentence that may be the most unsettling description of human dependence in all his work:

The man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.

"Living only with the permission of others" — this is exactly where formal freedom separates from real freedom. One whose continued life depends on the permission of another power is not free, however much the law calls him free. Now carry this logic to its end: the power of execution is the ultimate form of that "permission." A state that reserves the right of execution tells every citizen: your life, in the final analysis, continues by my permission. The principle of the non-ownability of human life is the negation of that sentence.

d) The 1853 Article: What Marx Wrote Directly About Capital Punishment

It is less often read that on January 28, 1853, in an article titled "Capital Punishment" in the New-York Daily Tribune, Marx addressed this subject directly. The occasion was a leading article in The Times of London that had called execution "the ultimate argument of society" and, in Marx's phrase, had engaged in "a direct apotheosis of the hangman." Marx's answer, more than a century and a half later, remains one of the most compressed critiques of the death penalty ever written.

First, he questions the very foundation:

It would be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to establish any principle upon which the justice or expediency of capital punishment could be founded, in a society glorying in its civilization.

Then he rejects the two common justifications of punishment — reforming the criminal and intimidating others:

Punishment in general has been defended as a means either of ameliorating or of intimidating. Now what right have you to punish me for the amelioration or intimidation of others? And besides, there is history — there is such a thing as statistics — which prove with the most complete evidence that since Cain the world has neither been intimidated nor ameliorated by punishment.

Marx then examines the retributive theory of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel — which regarded punishment as "the criminal's own right" and the result of his own will — and reads it as a transcendental cover for sanctifying the rules of existing society: a theory that, instead of defending the real human being, gives the existing order a "transcendental sanction." And then he writes his famous sentence:

What a state of society is that, which knows of no better instrument for its own defense than the hangman, and which proclaims through the "leading journal of the world" its own brutality as eternal law?

Finally, drawing on the statistics of Adolphe Quetelet, the Belgian statistician — who had spoken of "a budget which we pay with frightful regularity; it is that of prisons, dungeons and scaffolds" — he concludes that crime is a regular product of social conditions, and that the real question lies elsewhere:

Is there not a necessity for deeply reflecting upon an alteration of the system that breeds these crimes, instead of glorifying the hangman who executes a lot of criminals to make room only for the supply of new ones?

Scholarly honesty requires us to mark the boundary of this text as well: it is a journalistic article, not a systematic theory of punishment; and Marx's center of gravity, here and throughout his work, is the system that produces crime, not merely the court's verdict. But for our discussion, this very point deepens the argument: a state that presides over the crime-producing conditions and then kills the criminal claims ownership twice — once over the conditions of life, and once over life itself.

4. The State Represents Society; It Does Not Own Human Beings

The state is a product of the social organization of human beings; it is the institution society has created to administer its common affairs. The legitimacy of the state — in any democratic theory — derives from the will and participation of the people. But that very origin also fixes the state's limit: a representative cannot hold more right than those it represents held. This is Beccaria's argument from Section 1, now from the angle of the structure of power: no citizen owns the life of another citizen; therefore the sum of citizens does not either; therefore parliament, court, and state do not either. A sum of zeros, however large, does not make a number.

Two important conclusions follow. First, about the majority: a majority may decide about taxes, foreign policy, and traffic laws; but a majority vote cannot create ownership over the life of an individual or a minority. If it could, a "right" would no longer be a right; it would be a permit the majority issues on Tuesday and revokes on Wednesday. Second, about the law: the legality of an act is not identical with its legitimacy. Law is the formalization of political will in procedural form; it can be perfectly legal and still have crossed the boundary of legitimate power. The twentieth century is full of entirely "legal" massacres.

The state, then, is society's representative and servant; and a servant does not become the owner of his master's life.

5. Justice or Revenge?

The strongest philosophical defense of harsh punishment is the retributive theory, formulated by Hegel: punishment is the criminal's own right; in punishing him, we recognize him as a rational and free being who is answerable for his own will. Marx criticized this very theory in the 1853 article and showed how it sanctifies the existing order. But a deeper criticism can also be made: a theory that claims to "honor" the criminal's rationality and dignity through punishment consumes itself in the death penalty, because it destroys the very subject of that honor — the living human being. One cannot honor a person as a rational agent by killing him.

A clear line must be drawn between two concepts. Justice means accountability: the individual is held responsible for his act, is tried, and reparation, restriction of liberty, and rehabilitation come into play, while society is protected against a repetition of violence. Revenge means taking a life in answer to a life taken; the state's imitation of the crime itself, with an official signature. The abolition of the death penalty is not the abolition of justice; it is the separation of justice from the logic of revenge.

And an ethical contradiction lies at the heart of the defense of execution: a society that, in order to defend the right to life, takes the right to life of another human being, violates the very principle it claims to defend. If human life is sacred and inviolable, that sanctity cannot be suspended by a court verdict; and if it can be, there was no sanctity to begin with.

6. The Fallibility of the Judiciary and the Irreversibility of Execution

All punishments share one feature — except one: all of them can be remedied, at least in part, except execution. An innocent prisoner can be freed and compensated, however incompletely; the dead cannot be brought back. From this rises an argument independent of any philosophical position: the judiciary is fallible, and execution is irreversible; the combination of the two means accepting the occasional killing of the innocent as a cost of the system.

Error is not the rare exception of an otherwise healthy system; it has known mechanisms: mistaken identification, confessions under pressure, false testimony, incompetent counsel, judges under pressure from public opinion or political power. The statistical evidence is also clear: in the United States alone, since 1973 more than 200 people who had been sentenced to death have been exonerated and released — the figure of the Death Penalty Information Center. Each of those cases means a state that came within one step of killing an innocent human being; and no one can prove that the final step was never taken.

Add to this the class dimension on which Marx laid his finger: the gallows everywhere fall disproportionately on the poor, on ethnic and religious minorities, and on the politically defenseless. That is, the very people who, in the words of the Critique of the Gotha Programme, live even in everyday life "only with the permission of others," are also the most defenseless before the machinery of punishment.

7. Protecting Society Without the Death Penalty

Opposition to execution does not abandon the protection of society; it only changes its instrument. The legitimate aims of punishment are three: preventing fresh harm, holding the criminal accountable, and deterring others from crime. All three are attainable without killing.

For the most dangerous criminals, secure and long imprisonment does exactly what execution claims to do: the person can no longer harm society. But as for deterrence, the defenders' claim has not been proven empirically. The U.S. National Research Council, in its comprehensive 2012 report, concluded that existing research on whether the death penalty affects homicide rates is "not informative" — that is, science, to this day, has not shown a greater deterrent effect for execution than for long imprisonment. The experience of countries that abolished the death penalty — such as Canada, which abolished it in 1976 — was likewise not accompanied by a rise in murder.

One distinction must also be kept precise: legitimate defense in the moment of danger — stopping an attacker who is in the act of killing — and the death penalty are two different things. Our principle concerns "punishment," not the instantaneous reaction to an ongoing attack. When a person has been captured and imprisoned and no immediate danger emanates from him, killing him is no longer defense; it is a cold, planned decision of power. And it is exactly that decision which the principle of the non-ownability of human life forbids.

8. Political Execution: The Purest Form of the Ownership Claim

If in ordinary execution the state claims ownership over the criminal's life, in political execution that claim reaches its purest and barest form: the state is at once plaintiff, judge, and owner of the rope. Charges such as "moharebeh" (waging war against God) and "efsad-e fel-arz" (corruption on earth) are mechanisms by which political dissent is converted into a capital crime, and the right to life is reduced to an instrument for preserving power itself.

Iran today is the clearest contemporary example of this mechanism: a country that, relative to its population, stands at the top of the world's executioners, and in which street protesters, civil activists, and dissenters are sent to the gallows on security charges. But our argument is larger than one country. Every state that reserves for itself the right to kill its opponents has announced to all its citizens that life is a revocable license. And the first victims of such an order are always those for whose defense the principle of the non-ownability of human life was built: the dissenter, the minority, the accused, and the powerless.

For this reason, principled opposition to the death penalty cannot be reduced to opposition to executions in one particular regime. If a principle is a principle, it must stand against every flag and every ideology.

9. The Hard Question: Does Even a Democratic Society of the People Have No Such Right?

We now reach the hardest question of this discussion — the one without whose answer the whole edifice of the article remains shaky. Suppose a state is neither despotic nor the instrument of a ruling class; it is a society with social ownership of the means of production and real democracy. Can such a society — in the name of the collective interest and by the free vote of the people — take the life of an individual?

Our answer is no — and it is exactly here that the principle of the non-ownability of human life proves itself as a principle. A principle that binds only "their" state and not "ours" is not a principle; it is a propaganda weapon. Historical honesty says the same: the revolutionary states of the twentieth century also executed — including some that ruled in Marx's name — sometimes on a horrific scale. If the theory of A New Social Order in the Age of Consciousness wants to learn from that experience, it must bind, in advance and forever, the very power it hopes to build: no power owns a human life — not even a power that calls itself justice, and not even a power that has risen from the people themselves.

The reason must also be stated. Social ownership of the means of production removes the human being's private dependence on the capitalist; but "collective ownership of the individual's life" does not follow from it. Society is not an entity separate from living human beings that could regard them as its assets; society exists only in the existence of each of these human beings, and the whole cannot own the lives of its parts. The majority, too — however large — is answered by Beccaria's argument: what no one ever had, the sum of everyone does not have either.

Here the link to the heart of the theory of A New Social Order in the Age of Consciousness becomes clear. If we regard freedom as the oxygen of the new social order in the age of consciousness, the right to life is the fundamental condition of the possibility of freedom; for a human being whose right to life lies in the hands of another power — however democratic that power may be — lives, at the most fundamental level, "with the permission of others," and in Marx's words in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, is not free. A civilization that wants the human being to be the conscious subject of his own destiny cannot keep the first condition of subjecthood — being alive — in the hands of power.

10. The Fundamental Principle: The Non-Ownability of Human Life

The principle can now be formulated — as our proposed formulation for the theory of A New Social Order in the Age of Consciousness, not as a quotation from anyone:

The principle of the non-ownability of human life: Human life is neither a commodity, nor the property of the state, nor an instrument of revenge, nor an object of ownership by any individual or institution. No human being owns the life of another human being, and no power — state, court, majority, religion, or ideology — can regard itself as holding the right to end a human life. Society has the right to defend itself against crime, to try and hold the criminal accountable, and to restrict the liberty of a dangerous person within the framework of the law; but none of these powers includes the right to take his life.

And its one-line form, which can stand at the head of the chapter "Freedom, Justice and the Right to Life" in the book A New Social Order in the Age of Consciousness:

No power owns a human life — not even a power that calls itself justice.

What does this principle forbid, and what does it permit? It forbids: the death penalty in all its forms — ordinary and political, in peace and in war, for the citizen and for the prisoner. It permits: prosecution, a fair trial, imprisonment and restriction of liberty proportionate to the crime and — wherever possible — reviewable and reparable. In other words, our principle sets the ceiling of punitive power: power may restrict liberty, because it is society itself that organizes liberty; but it may not take life, because society did not give life.

Conclusion: A Boundary for Power

From the leading article of The Times in 1853 that glorified the hangman, to the gallows erected today, the question is one: is there a power that owns a human life? This article's answer is no — and the answer comes not from soft-heartedness toward the criminal, but from fixing the boundary of power. The abolition of the death penalty is not leniency; it is the line before which the state — every state — must halt and beyond which it has no right to pass.

In 1853 Marx asked: "What a state of society is that, which knows of no better instrument for its own defense than the hangman?" The theory of A New Social Order in the Age of Consciousness adds one step to that question: a society that wants to build a new social order in the age of consciousness must have accepted in advance that human life belongs to no one — not to the state, not to a class, not to a capitalist, not to a majority, and not to any political or religious institution. The new social order in the age of consciousness begins exactly where power bows before the one right it did not create.

Sources

Karl Marx, "Capital Punishment," New-York Daily Tribune, February 17–18, 1853.

Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I, Chapter 6: The Buying and Selling of Labour-Power, 1867.

Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, 1875.

Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.

Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, 1764.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 1820.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3, 1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6, 1966, and its Second Optional Protocol on the abolition of the death penalty, 1989.

U.S. National Research Council, Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 2012.

Death Penalty Information Center, data on exonerations of death-row prisoners in the United States.

Amnesty International, annual reports on the death penalty worldwide.